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WHO SHOULD POLICE POLITICIZATION OF THE
DOJ?
BRUCE A. GREEN* & REBECCA ROIPHE**
During the Trump administration, the public witnessed warring
accusations about politicization of the Department of Justice (“DOJ”). Attorney
General William Barr criticized what he perceived to be the politically
motivated investigation into Russian interference in the 2016 election, labeling
it “one of the greatest travesties in American history.”1 Others, including
independent watchdogs and former employees of the DOJ, maintained, to the
contrary, that career officials, including those who launched the Russia probe,
acted with integrity; they accused Barr of ushering improper partisan
motivations into DOJ’s work.2
Allegations like these create two problems. First, although prosecutors
should never allow partisan concerns to affect their decisions in individual
cases, it is hard to determine if and when this corruption of federal prosecutorial
decision-making has occurred. Second, leaving allegations of partisanship
unresolved poses a danger to the rule of law, because the public may have faith
in high-profile prosecutions only if the outcome corresponds with their
ideological preferences, dismissing all others as the product of partisan bias. To
address these problems, this Article argues that one body should take the lead
in investigating politicization of the DOJ and analyzes which one is in the best
position to do so.
At the moment, a number of different officials and agencies have authority
to uncover corruption and political bias in the Department of Justice. At least
*
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1. Aaron Blake, ‘One of the Greatest Travesties in American History’: Barr Drops All
Pretense About Ongoing Probe of Russia Investigation, WASH. POST (Apr. 9, 2020),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/2020/04/09/one-greatest-travesties-american-historybarr-drops-all-pretense-about-ongoing-probe-russia-investigation/; see Editorial, Barr Claims
Trump-Russia Investigation was FBI Attempt to ‘Sabotage’ the President, GUARDIAN (Apr. 10,
2020),
https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2020/apr/10/william-barr-donald-trump-russiainvestigation-fbi-sabotage.
2. See Nicholas Fandos, Katie Benner & Charlie Savage, Justice Dept. Officials Outline
Claims
of
Politicization
Under
Barr,
N.Y.
TIMES
(July
10,
2020),
https://www.nytimes.com/2020/06/24/us/politics/justice-department-politicization.html; George
Croner, Ethics Groups Say Barr’s Use of DOJ is Shredding its Essential Independence, JUST SEC.
(Oct. 26, 2020), https://www.justsecurity.org/73014/ethics-groups-say-barrs-use-of-doj-isshredding-its-essential-independence/.
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in some situations, trial courts, federal and state disciplinary authorities,
Congress, as well as several units within DOJ itself, can pursue a claim that a
particular federal prosecutor was acting for impermissible partisan reasons.
This Article analyzes these different actors’ roles and responsibilities and
concludes that the DOJ Inspector General (“IG”) is in the best position to serve
this function and ought to be given broader authority to do so. Of course, our
system requires checks and balances, and an unlimited power to investigate and
address politicization within DOJ would be problematic, but the Inspector
General’s office is not a rogue actor. It is overseen by Congress, as well as by
the President, who has the power to remove the IG from office.
DOJ Inspectors General are in the best position to root out potential
political partisanship and bias for two reasons: first, they are least likely to have
a political bias themselves; second, they have the requisite experience to
conduct a thorough investigation and the statutory mandate to make an
investigation public. While it is true that almost everyone has some partisan
allegiance or preference, some actors are more likely to allow these views to
distort their independent judgment. Political appointees who have worked to
strengthen their ties to politicians and may have political aspirations themselves
are more likely to allow impermissible partisan consideration to affect their
work. They are more likely to view facts through a political lens or skew the
events in a way that favors the politicians with whom they have a personal
relationship. This is, of course, not true of every political appointee but seems
a fair generalization.3 Even if it were not true, the public would be right to
question the judgment of an individual who has political aspirations and
political connections, and this alone is enough to destabilize our institutions.
In arguing that the Inspector General should have the principal
responsibility for investigating the politicization of DOJ, this Article is divided
into two parts. Part I discusses the alternatives to the DOJ Inspector General—
trial courts, disciplinary authorities, Congress, and others in DOJ—and their
limitations. It also notes that political accountability is an inadequate
alternative. Part II gives an historical overview of the Inspector General’s job
and argues that the Inspector General role was conceived and designed for this
sort of work. The Inspector General is both equipped to do the job and the least
likely to be biased in the investigation.

3. See Rebecca Ingber, Bureaucratic Resistance and the National Security State, 104 IOWA
L. REV. 139, 155 (2018) (arguing that fear of bureaucracy may lead to an erosion of the important
constraint on presidential power, but over-reliance is also dangerous in that it may lead to the
abdication of responsibility from other branches).
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I. OTHER POSSIBLE REGULATORS: MANY OVERSEERS, LITTLE OVERSIGHT
Federal prosecutors have extraordinary power,4 which they are supposed
to wield in the public interest,5 not in service of partisan politics. The principle
applies to all prosecutors, not uniquely to federal ones. The American Bar
Association’s prosecution function standards, which reflect a professional
consensus among members of the legal profession,6 provide that “[a] prosecutor
should not use . . . improper considerations, such as partisan or political or
personal considerations, in exercising prosecutorial discretion.”7 The principle
is uncontroversial and contemporary U.S. Attorneys General universally
acknowledge it.8 In the lead-up to the 2020 presidential election, for example,
Attorney General William Barr reaffirmed that “partisan politics must play no
role in the decisions of federal investigators or prosecutors regarding any
investigations or criminal charges.”9
DOJ has adopted procedures to deter its prosecutors from partisan abuses
of power. For example, as a matter of self-regulation, it has internal restrictions
on DOJ lawyers’ political activities and a practice of restricting the timing of
certain decisions,10 and particularly of indictments, that may influence voters on
4. See Robert H. Jackson, The Federal Prosecutor, 31 J. AM. INST. CRIM. L. &
CRIMINOLOGY 3, 3 (1940) (“The prosecutor has more control over life, liberty, and reputation than
any other person in America.”). Attorney General Jackson’s observations remain relevant today—
indeed, they are still considered to be highly significant. See, e.g., Charles R. Wilson, “That Justice
Shall Be Done”—Constitutional Requirements, Ethical Rules, and the Professional Ideal of Federal
Prosecution, 36 N. ILL. U. L. REV. 111, 112 (2015).
5. As the U.S. Supreme Court recognized 85 years ago, a prosecutor “is the representative
not of an ordinary party to a controversy, but of a sovereignty whose obligation to govern impartially
is as compelling as its obligation to govern at all; and whose interest, therefore, in a criminal
prosecution is not that it shall win a case, but that justice shall be done.” Berger v. United States,
295 U.S. 78, 88 (1935). See generally MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT, r. 3.8 cmt. 1 (AM. BAR
ASS’N 2020) (“A prosecutor has the responsibility of a minister of justice and not simply that of an
advocate.”); see also Bruce A. Green & Rebecca Roiphe, A Fiduciary Theory of Prosecution, 69
AM. U. L. REV. 805, 814–23 (2020) (maintaining that the prosecutor’s obligation to serve the public,
which requires “independence from both political influence and popular control,” derives both
historically and theoretically from the prosecutor’s fiduciary role as a public official).
6. See Rory K. Little, The ABA’s Project to Revise the Criminal Justice Standards for the
Prosecution and Defense Functions, 62 HASTINGS L.J. 1111, 1113 (2011).
7. CRIMINAL JUSTICE STANDARDS FOR THE PROSECUTION FUNCTION, Standard 3-1.6(a)
(AM. BAR ASS’N 2017). To similar effect is STANDARDS ON PROSECUTORIAL INVESTIGATIONS,
Standard 2.1(d)(1) (AM. BAR ASS’N 2014) (“When deciding whether to initiate or continue an
investigation, the prosecutor should not be influenced by . . . partisan or other improper political or
personal considerations . . . .”) (quoted by the court in State v. Martinez, 2019 N.J. Super. LEXIS
153, at *59 (Oct. 29, 2019)).
8. See Bruce A. Green & Rebecca Roiphe, Can the President Control the Department of
Justice?, 70 ALA. L. REV. 1, 22 n.107 (2018).
9. Memorandum from the Att’y Gen. to all U.S. Dep’t of Just. Emps. (May 15, 2020),
https://assets.documentcloud.org/documents/7221422/Barr-memo-Election-Year-Sensitivities.pdf.
10. See U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., Political Activities, https://www.justice.gov/jmd/politicalactivities.
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the eve of an election.11 Beginning after Watergate, and until Trump took
office, DOJ also limited prosecutors’ communications with White House
personnel.12 At one time, the federal Independent Counsel Act identified
criminal cases where there was a particularly high risk of prosecutorial
partisanship—namely, cases of alleged corruption by high-ranking federal
executive-branch officials—and shifted investigative and prosecutorial
authority from DOJ lawyers to independent court-appointed prosecutors.13 That
is the law that gave us Ken Starr’s investigation of President Clinton.14 Even
such skeptics as Justice Scalia, who thought the law was unconstitutional,15
acknowledged the risk of prosecutors’ political partisanship but thought “the
primary check against prosecutorial abuse is a political one.”16 When Congress
allowed the law to sunset,17 DOJ replaced it with the special counsel regulations
that led to Robert Mueller’s investigation of President Trump.18
Despite these sorts of prophylactic procedural measures, DOJ is
sometimes suspected or accused of political partisanship,19 and never more so
than under Attorney General Barr’s leadership in the latter part of the Trump
Administration. Soon after taking office, Barr allegedly served Trump’s
political interests before the Mueller report was made public by misleadingly
describing the report’s findings.20 Later, he appeared to be assisting various of
the President’s political cronies, including by countermanding the trial
prosecutors’ sentencing recommendation in Trump’s 2016 campaign chairman

11. See OFF. OF THE INSPECTOR GEN., U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., OVERSIGHT & REV. DIV. 18–
40, A REVIEW OF VARIOUS ACTIONS BY THE FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION AND
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE IN ADVANCE OF THE 2016 ELECTION 16–18 (June 2018),
https://www.justice.gov/file/1071991/download.
12. See White House Communications with the DOJ and FBI, PROTECT DEMOCRACY (Mar.
8, 2017), https://protectdemocracy.org/agencycontacts/.
13. Ethics in Government Act of 1978, 28 U.S.C. §§ 591–598 (sunset after reauthorizations
in 1999).
14. For an account and critique of Starr’s investigation of President Clinton, see Marjorie
Cohn, The Politics of the Clinton Impeachment and the Death of the Independent Counsel Statute:
Toward Depoliticization, 102 W. VA. L. REV. 59, 63–70 (1999).
15. See Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 697–734 (1988) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
16. Id. at 728.
17. See Ken Gormley, Monica Lewinsky, Impeachment, and the Death of the Independent
Counsel Law: What Congress Can Salvage from the Wreckage—A Minimalist View, 60 MD. L. REV.
97 (2001) (discussing the Act’s demise).
18. See ROBERT S. MUELLER, III, U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., REPORT ON THE INVESTIGATION
INTO RUSSIAN INTERFERENCE IN THE 2016 PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION (Mar. 2019).
19. See, e.g., infra notes 107–09 and accompanying text (discussing Attorney General
Alberto Gonzalez’s firing of U.S. Attorneys during the George W. Bush administration).
20. See Letter from 27 Members of the Washington, D.C. Bar to the Off. of Disciplinary
Couns.
at
4–16
(July
22,
2020),
https://www.justsecurity.org/wpcontent/uploads/2020/07/Professional-Responsibility-Investigation-of-William-P.-BarrComplaint-DC-Bar-Association-July-22-2020.pdf (asserting that Barr made multiple misleading
statements regarding the Mueller report).
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Roger Stone’s case (before Stone was pardoned)21 and moving to dismiss
charges to which Michael Flynn, the President’s first National Security advisor,
had twice pled guilty.22 And Barr was accused of initiating unfounded criminal
investigations to promote the President’s interests or to serve the President’s
whims.23 Indeed, just one month before the 2020 election, federal prosecutors
purportedly sought to influence voters by announcing election fraud
investigations, exploiting Barr’s exception to longstanding DOJ policy against
announcing investigations with upcoming elections in mind.24 After the Stone
sentencing recommendation, more than one thousand former DOJ officials
signed a letter denouncing Barr for flouting the fundamental principle “that
political interference in the conduct of a criminal prosecution is anathema to the
Department’s core mission and to its sacred obligation to ensure equal justice
under the law.”25 Then, in the weeks before the election, in an unprecedented
step, two current federal prosecutors publicly accused the attorney general of

21. See DOJ Alumni Statement on the Events Surrounding the Sentencing of Roger Stone
(Feb.
16,
2020),
https://medium.com/@dojalumni/doj-alumni-statement-on-the-eventssurrounding-the-sentencing-of-roger-stone-c2cb75ae4937 (statement of over 1,000 former DOJ
officials condemning Barr’s interference in the administration of justice in connection with Stone’s
sentencing).
22. See Brief for Court-Appointed Amicus Curiae at 2–3, United States v. Flynn, No. 17-cr232 (EGS) (D.D.C. June 10, 2020) (asserting that: “courts [are empowered] to protect the integrity
of their own proceedings from prosecutors who undertake corrupt, politically motivated
dismissals. . . . That is what happened here. The Government has engaged in highly irregular
conduct to benefit a political ally of the President.”).
23. See, e.g., John Durham’s Politicized Investigation — And William Barr’s Role in It, AM.
OVERSIGHT (Jan. 20, 2021), https://www.americanoversight.org/investigation/john-durhamspoliticized-investigation-and-william-barrs-role-in-it.
24. See Robert Faturechi & Justin Elliott, The Justice Department May Have Violated
Attorney General Barr’s Own Policy Memo, PROPUBLICA (Oct. 6, 2020),
https://www.propublica.org/article/the-justice-department-may-have-violated-attorney-generalbarrs-own-policy-memo; Robert Faturechi & Justin Elliott, DOJ Frees Federal Prosecutors to Take
Steps That Could Interfere With Elections, Weakening Long-Standing Policy, PROPUBLICA (Oct. 7,
2020),
https://www.huffpost.com/entry/doj-frees-federal-prosecutors-to-take-steps-that-couldinterfere-with-elections-weakening-long-standing-policy_n_5f7df355c5b6fc1dec78ba0a.
Less
than three weeks before the election, the Democratic chairs of four House of Representatives
committees called on DOJ’s Inspector General to conduct an emergency review to ascertain whether
the publicly-announced investigation of election law violations was meant to influence the election.
Letter from Rep. Jerrold Nadler et al. to Inspector Gen. Michael E. Horowitz (Oct. 19, 2020),
https://www.law360.com/articles/1321152/attachments/0.
25. DOJ Alumni Statement on the Events Surrounding the Sentencing of Roger Stone, supra
note 21. Members of the bar subsequently signed a similar indictment of Barr’s conduct. Open
Letter Supporting the 100,000 Lawyers, Agents and Staff Members of the U.S. Department of
Justice,
LAWS.
DEFENDING
A M.
DEMOCRACY
(Oct.
1,
2020),
https://lawyersdefendingdemocracy.org/open-letter-supporting-the-us-doj/ (“By word and deed,
Attorney General Barr has demonstrated a willingness to politicize the DOJ by backing and helping
to implement the President’s most partisan and extreme views.”).
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playing politics,26 and a third announced that he was resigning over the attorney
general’s meddling in criminal cases in “slavish obedience” to the President’s
will.27
Political accountability is not effective for this sort of transgression. The
President can fire the attorney general when DOJ is mismanaged but will have
no incentive to do so when DOJ acts to further the President’s own political
ambitions or allegiances. When a first-term President runs for reelection, the
public might hold the President accountable for DOJ’s abuses of prosecutorial
power for partisan ends. But the possibility of such a reckoning is unrealistic.
Even local prosecutors who themselves run for office are unlikely to pay a
political price for partisan abuses, both because their abuses of prosecutorial
power can be hidden,28 and because voters probably tolerate abuses with which
they sympathize. It is even less likely that voters would ever hold a President
accountable for federal prosecutors’ abuses. Even assuming voters might
prioritize DOJ’s work when choosing a President, they would rarely have
enough information to make well-informed judgments.
Prosecutors’
discretionary decisions may seem to be politically motivated, but neither the
public nor the press has access to DOJ’s internal workings to confirm whether
prosecutors abused their power or had legitimate motivations. Unless a court
or other public body thoroughly investigates and credibly reveals that federal
prosecutors used their power for political advantage, political accountability is
not a meaningful possibility, even if members of the public voting for President
were disposed to prioritize federal prosecutions.
To hold federal prosecutors accountable when they serve impermissible
political ends, some institution must have authority, tools, and motivation both
to investigate potential and apparent abuses and ultimately to resolve whether
abuses occurred.29 It would not be enough to uncover instances when White
26. See Michael Dion, Letter to the Editor, SEATTLE TIMES (Oct. 6, 2020),
https://www.seattletimes.com/opinion/attorney-general-william-barr-america-deserves-better/
(“Prosecutors are supposed to do their jobs without regard to party or politics. Barr, however, is
turning the Justice Department into a shield to protect the president and his henchmen.”); James D.
Herbert, Letter to the Editor, Barr Dishonors Justice Department, BOSTON GLOBE (Sept. 24, 2020),
https://www.bostonglobe.com/2020/09/24/opinion/barr-dishonors-justice-department/
(“The
attorney general acts as though his job is to serve only the political interests of Donald J. Trump.
This is a dangerous abuse of power.”).
27. Phillip Halpern, Commentary, I Won’t Work in Attorney General William Barr’s Justice
Department
Any
Longer,
SAN
DIEGO
UNION-TRIBUNE
(Oct.
14,
2020),
https://www.sandiegouniontribune.com/opinion/commentary/story/2020-10-14/william-barrdepartment-of-justice-doj.
28. Cf. Bruce Green & Ellen Yaroshefsky, Prosecutorial Accountability 2.0, 92 NOTRE
DAME L. REV. 51, 66 (2016) (“[A]bsent effective media scrutiny of prosecutors’ conduct, interested
voters [cannot] make informed assessments of an office’s professional practices.”); Ronald F.
Wright, How Prosecutor Elections Fail Us, 6 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 581, 583 (2009) (concluding that
prosecutor elections “do not often force an incumbent to give any public explanation at all for the
priorities and practices of the office”).
29. At the margins, the principle that prosecutors—even elected prosecutors—must exercise
their authority without regard to partisan politics may raise definitional questions. The President
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House officials privately pressured or importuned prosecutors. It is improper
for prosecutors to use their power to further political ends even if no one in the
White House expressly asks them to do so.30 Prosecutors should not treat some
individuals more favorably than others because they happen to be the
President’s cronies or members of the President’s party or treat others more
harshly because they are the current administration’s opponents. To uncover
such abuses, investigators must be able to question prosecutors about their
decision-making processes and internal deliberations.
This Article examines several different institutions’ competence to elicit
the relevant facts and to make reliable determinations about prosecutors’
political misuses of power. This question implicates practical concerns, such as
whether particular institutions have adequate expertise and resources and are
sufficiently objective and independent: the institution investigating accusations
of DOJ politicization should itself be free from political pressures. And for
investigative findings to have a meaningful role in responding to abuses of
prosecutorial power, the institution must be able to act on them or disclose them
publicly, so that others can act. This question also implicates jurisdictional
considerations: does the particular institution have jurisdiction to look into
political abuses by at any DOJ lawyer in any criminal case, or is the institution’s
authority limited so that it can investigate only certain lawyers, certain political
abuses, or certain cases? Finally, this question raises political and constitutional
concerns, such as whether an institution’s inquiry will interfere with
prosecutors’ legitimate work and whether its conclusions will win public
confidence.
Before turning in Part II to the Inspector General, whom we deem to be
the preferable investigator, this Part looks at other conceivable candidates: the
courts in both the trial and disciplinary contexts, Congress, and other arms of
the Department of Justice itself. We show that, although other institutions have
legitimate responsibilities and opportunities to oversee federal prosecutors, each

may establish criminal justice policy for the DOJ to implement, and while the policy may reflect
the views or preferences of the President’s political party, pursuing criminal-justice objectives is
not illegitimately partisan. On the other hand, it would be illegitimately partisan for the DOJ to
prosecute cases of voting fraud by individuals and organizations when they try to benefit the
opposing party but not when they try to benefit the President’s party. It may not always be easy to
distinguish the legitimate (even if politically controversial) pursuit of policy priorities from the
illegitimate use of power for partisan ends. Although the general principle of prosecutorial
nonpartisanship has garnered near universal acceptance, whoever polices the politicization of DOJ
may have to adopt, or be given, a more detailed standard or understanding.
30. William Barr attempted to defend his meddling in the Roger Stone case by claiming that
he was acting on his own rather than responding to the President’s tweet. He stated in an interview,
the President is “mak[ing] it impossible for me to do my job.” Anna Flaherty, Barr Blasts Trump’s
Tweets on Stone Case: ‘Impossible for Me to Do My Job’, ABC NEWS (Feb. 13, 2020),
https://abcnews.go.com/Politics/barr-blasts-trumps-tweets-stone-case-impossiblejob/story?id=68963276. But if Barr second guessed the sentence in order to further a political
agenda, it does not matter whether he was acting at his own initiative or following the President’s
order.
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has significant limitations when it comes to policing political abuses of power
in particular.
A. Judicial Accountability
Federal prosecutors may be accountable to courts in two contexts:
prosecutors’ conduct in federal criminal cases is overseen by the courts before
which they appear; and, as licensed practitioners, prosecutors are subject to
disciplinary oversight by the judiciaries of the jurisdictions where they are
licensed or practice. In some respects, federal courts might appear to be the
ideal regulators when prosecutors abuse their power for political ends. Federal
courts have expertise in applying legal and ethical norms to a given set of facts
and can be expected to apply the relevant standards more objectively than
members of other political branches. Federal courts have significant limitations,
however, because their role in our system of separation of powers deprives them
of the broad investigative powers needed to root out this particular impropriety.
State courts exercising disciplinary authority are equally limited.
1.

Trial Court Review

Federal judges have supervisory authority over parties and lawyers,
including prosecutors, who appear before them31 and might conceivably
exercise that power to police abuses of prosecutorial power for political ends.
But judges’ limited role in our system of separation of powers makes them less
than ideal for this task, both because they can address only a fraction of the
cases where this abuse may be present and because they have limited
investigative powers.
Trial judges can decide legal issues only in cases that properly come
before them. They cannot initiate inquiries into prosecutorial misconduct based
on news accounts or any other extrajudicial allegation of misconduct. In many
cases where federal prosecutors may have acted with improper political
motivations, trial courts will have no opportunity to inquire. For example, if
federal prosecutors decide not to initiate an investigation or prosecution of
suspected criminal conduct because the suspect is the President’s crony, the
matter will never come before a court at all. Members of the public may be

31. See Fred C. Zacharias & Bruce A. Green, Federal Court Authority to Regulate Lawyers:
A Practice in Search of Theory, 56 VAND. L. REV. 1303 (2003). This authority is typically exercised
with respect to federal prosecutors when the defense makes a motion alleging prosecutorial
misconduct of some sort, at which point the parties may litigate whether the prosecutor misbehaved.
Courts may also initiate inquiries into prosecutorial misconduct and investigate them independently
of the defense. For example, in response to apparent discovery abuse, a judge might issue an order
to show cause why the prosecutor should not be sanctioned. See Green & Yaroshefsky, supra note
28, at 74 (discussing district judges’ issuance of such orders). Or a judge might appoint a special
master to investigate as Judge Sullivan did following the revelation of discovery misconduct in the
prosecution of Senator Ted Stevens. See id. at 73–74 (discussing appointment of special master). If
the court concludes that the prosecutor misbehaved, it might sanction the offending prosecutor.
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disappointed, but they could not persuade a court that it had power to
countermand the federal prosecutors’ decision.32
Even when alleged prosecutorial misconduct relates to a federal criminal
case, federal judges will not necessarily adjudicate the allegations, because they
generally view the regulation of lawyers as ancillary to their principal function
of deciding cases. Seeking to conserve their resources, trial courts prefer to
respond to allegations of prosecutorial misconduct only as necessary to decide
a legal question raised in a case.33 Otherwise, courts typically leave it to
disciplinary authorities to resolve contested questions of professional conduct.
Further, concerns about separation of powers counsel federal judges against
probing the confidential decision-making processes of federal prosecutors, who
are members of the executive branch. Therefore, if DOJ appears to be
politically motivated in a case before the court, but no party complains, as when
Attorney General Barr countermanded the trial prosecutors’ sentencing
recommendation for Roger Stone, trial judges will ordinarily ignore suspicions
about prosecutorial misconduct because the prosecutors’ conduct is not central
to any question that the court must decide.
The district court’s inquiry in the Flynn prosecution34 is a rare
counter-example, but one that ultimately underscores federal trial judges’
limited authority. Before Flynn’s sentencing, when the prosecution moved to
dismiss the case purportedly because of insufficient evidence, Judge Sullivan
took the initiative to appoint a lawyer, former federal district judge John
Gleeson, as amicus curiae to argue against dismissal.35 A presidential pardon
of Flynn interrupted the proceedings, but even if they had continued, it is unclear
whether the district court could have held the prosecutors accountable for a
political abuse. Although the appeals court denied the government’s request to
shut down the district judge’s inquiry, it was skeptical whether the district judge
had authority to conduct a wide-ranging evidentiary hearing and ultimately
could rule on the government’s motion other than by granting it.36 And it is
nearly certain that the court’s hands would have been tied if the government had
made its motion before Flynn pled guilty rather than after.
Judicial oversight is more likely when the defense seeks a remedy for
prosecutors’ alleged abuse of power. For example, in moving to dismiss
criminal charges based on selective or vindictive prosecution or based on a
denial of the right to a disinterested prosecutor, the defense may allege that
prosecutors were politically motivated to pursue the charges. These kinds of
32. See Stephanos Bibas, Prosecutorial Regulation Versus Prosecutorial Accountability,
157 U. PA. L. REV. 959, 970, 970 n.41 (2009) (“The separation of powers, courts hold, forbids
judicial interference with prosecutorial discretion to decline to file charges.”) (citing authority).
33. See, e.g., Cont’l Ins. Co. v. Superior Ct., 32 Cal. App. 4th 94, 111 n.5 (1995) (“ [T]he
‘business’ of the court is to dispose of ‘litigation’ and not to oversee the ethics of those that practice
before it unless the behavior ‘taints’ the trial.”) (citing Monsanto Co. v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 593
A.2d 1013, 1020 (Del. 1990)).
34. See In re Flynn, 973 F.3d 74 (D.C. Cir. 2020).
35. See id. at 76–77.
36. See id. at 80–82.
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motions have no track record of success, however.37 Reluctant to interfere with
prosecutors’ discretionary decisions about whom to investigate or charge,
federal courts require substantial evidence to overcome the presumption that
prosecutors are acting in good faith.38 The legal standard for setting aside
politically partisan prosecutions, though neither clear nor well-established, is
demanding. The standard cannot be met simply by evidence that a particular
prosecutor has a strong political identification,39 or that the timing of events
supports an inference that prosecutors were politically influenced.40 While
demanding more, courts do not allow defendants to conduct the discovery into
prosecutors’ decision-making processes needed to find it.41 Nor do judges have
authority and inclination to initiate their own inquiries except perhaps in the
most exceptional cases.
2.

Disciplinary review

State and federal courts oversee disciplinary processes which are a
potential mechanism for policing prosecutors’ misuse of power for political
ends. As noted, district judges generally prefer to leave questions of lawyer
misconduct to the disciplinary process. Likewise, when courts hold that
prosecutors are immune from civil liability for politically-motivated charging
decisions, as for other abuses in the context of criminal adjudications, courts
point to professional discipline as an alternative.42 Disciplinary authorities may
be better positioned than trial courts because they can be proactive; they can
conduct investigations on their own initiative as well as in response to
complaints. They have investigative powers that are typically denied to
defendants in criminal proceedings, and they have authority to mete out
professional sanctions.

37. See, e.g., United States v. Scrushy, 721 F.3d 1288 (11th Cir. 2013) (denying effort to
overturn conviction, based on denial of a disinterested prosecutor, after investigations by Congress
and DOJ’s Office of Professional Responsibility into whether the prosecution was politically
motivated).
38. See, e.g., In re Grand Jury Subpoena Duces Tecum, 782 F. Supp. 1518, 1521–23 (N.D.
Ala. 1992) (rejecting claim that grand jury investigation is politically and racially motivated).
39. See United States DOJ v. Mandanici (In re Starr), 152 F.3d 741, 752–55 (8th Cir. 1998)
(Loken, J., concurring) (describing history of appointing politically-identified lawyers to investigate
and prosecute public corruption).
40. See, e.g., United States v. Pabian, 704 F.2d 1533, 1537 (11th Cir. 1983) (finding that
although the prosecutor represented the case to the grand jury after being criticized by members of
Congress, it “would have been clearly erroneous” to find that the prosecutor’s decision was
politically motivated).
41. See, e.g., United States v. MacLeod, 436 F.2d 947, 950 (8th Cir. 1971).
42. See, e.g., Bernard v. Cnty. of Suffolk, 356 F.3d 495, 504 (2d Cir. 2004) (“Certainly,
racially invidious or partisan prosecutions, pursued without probable cause, are reprehensible, but
such motives do not necessarily remove conduct from the protection of absolute
immunity . . . . [P]rosecutorial misconduct may be subject to professional or even criminal
sanctions at the same time that it fits within the scope of advocative functions entitled to absolute
immunity from suit for money damages.”) (citing Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409 (1976)).
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There are other limitations, however, on disciplinary authorities’ ability to
oversee prosecutors who have used their power politically. The disciplinary
power arises out of courts’ supervisory authority over members of the bar. In
the disciplinary context, that power is ordinarily used to enforce rules of
professional conduct adopted by the state judiciary to regulate lawyers. But the
only rule specifically targeting prosecutors’ charging decisions is the injunction
against pursuing cases without probable cause.43
On rare occasion, courts invoke conflict of interest rules or other
less-targeted disciplinary rules to sanction prosecutors who abuse their power
toward political ends.44 For example, the Indiana Supreme Court held that an
elected chief prosecutor and his chief deputy engaged in “conduct that was
prejudicial to the administration of justice” by exercising prosecutorial power
against an opposing candidate for political gain: they threatened to investigate
the candidate if he ran against the incumbent prosecutor, and when the candidate
elected to run, they filed disciplinary charges and sought to initiate a prosecution
against him.45 The Arizona Supreme Court disbarred the elected chief
prosecutor of Maricopa County, Arizona, and his deputy, in part, for misusing
their power to advance the chief prosecutor’s partisan political interests.46 Some
have argued that courts should amend the disciplinary rules to expand the
disciplinary regulation of prosecutors’ discretionary decision making.47

43. See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L. CONDUCT, r. 3.8(a) (AM. BAR ASS’N 2020).
44. See generally Bruce A. Green & Samuel J. Levine, Disciplinary Regulation of
Prosecutors as a Remedy for Abuses of Prosecutorial Discretion: A Descriptive and Normative
Analysis, 14 OHIO ST. J. CRIM L. 143, 158–61, 169–80 (2016); see, e.g., Bruce A. Green & Rebecca
Roiphe, Rethinking Prosecutors’ Conflicts of Interest, 58 B.C. L. REV. 463, 486–87 (2017).
45. In re Christoff, 690 N.E.2d 1135, 1141 (Ind. 1997). The court explained:
The key element of culpability in the [prosecutors’] actions was their use of the
prosecutorial powers to further their self-interests. [The chief prosecutor] used his
prosecutorial discretion and authority to further his interest in retaining his elected
position. [His deputy] actively assisted him in doing so. Use of prosecutorial authority
becomes improper when the sole or overriding motivation for exercising it is the
prosecutor’s personal benefit or gain, and not to further the public interest of effective
law application and enforcement.
Id.
46. In re State Bar of Ariz. v. Thomas, PDJ-2011-9002, at 233–46 (Ariz. Apr. 10, 2012),
http://archive.azcentral.com/ic/news/0410Thomas-Aubuchon.PDF. The court agreed with the
disciplinary authorities that the prosecutors’ substantial purpose in initiating criminal charges
against a member of the County Board of Supervisors “was to burden and embarrass a political foe”
and to exact “politically-motivated-revenge.” Id. at ¶¶ 89, 95, 97. The court found that, in acting in
their own political self-interest, the prosecutors had an impermissible conflict of interest, because
the chief prosecutor’s “personal animosity towards [the Supervisor] should have precluded them
from seeking his indictment and prosecution.” Id. at ¶¶ 105, 109. Additionally, the court found, the
prosecutors violated a professional conduct rule that forbids a lawyer from us[ing] means that have
“no substantial purpose other than to embarrass . . . or burden” any other person. Id. at ¶ 98 (citing
ARIZ. RULES OF PRO. CONDUCT, r. 4.4(a)).
47. See Samuel J. Levine, The Potential Utility of Disciplinary Regulation as a Remedy for
Abuses of Prosecutorial Discretion, 12 DUKE J. CONST. L. & PUB. POL’Y no. 2, 1 (2016); Samuel
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For several reasons, however, it would be a sharp break from traditional
practice for federal courts to regulate federal prosecutors through the
disciplinary process. First, the same separation-of-powers considerations that
make federal courts deferential to federal prosecutors’ charging and
plea-bargaining decisions would apply here. Courts have no clear disciplinary
standard to enforce against prosecutors who acted on political motivations, and
federal courts would be reluctant to adopt and apply one. Setting standards
governing prosecutors’ charging and plea-bargaining decisions is primarily a
job for Congress or for DOJ itself as an executive-branch agency, not for the
judiciary. Further, federal courts have resource limitations. Most require
lawyers appearing before them to abide by the state’s professional conduct rules
and defer to state court disciplinary processes to conduct investigations and
initiate disciplinary proceedings. Although federal courts have ad hoc
disciplinary processes, they rarely invoke them.
State courts have authority to regulate members of their state bars,
including federal prosecutors, who violate professional conduct rules. But
historically they have been reluctant to proceed against state prosecutors for
what seem to be clear violations of clear rules.48 State disciplinary authorities
would be more hesitant to regulate federal prosecutors and less inclined to
invoke vague rules to enforce standards against politically motivated federal
prosecutions. The constitutional legitimacy of such inquiry would be highly
questionable because of federalism concerns: It is doubtful whether state courts
have constitutional authority to make and enforce rules of professional conduct
that have the effect of dictating how federal executive agencies such as
prosecutors’ offices, acting through their lawyers, exercise their discretionary
charging power. Moreover, DOJ could be expected to employ its considerable
resources to defend its prosecutors, making a disciplinary investigation and
proceeding expensive and time-consuming for state authorities.49 Finally, state
disciplinary authorities are decentralized, which means that a state court’s
disciplinary decision would not necessarily set a standard for federal
prosecutors licensed in other states.
B. Legislative Accountability
An alternative is for Congress to police DOJ by initiating inquiries when
federal prosecutors appear to have acted for partisan political reasons. This is a
legitimate function for Congress, which has a stake in protecting federal
prosecutions from political influence including via law-making and, in the

J. Levine, Disciplinary Regulation of Prosecutorial Discretion: What Would a Rule Look Like?, 16
OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 347 (2019).
48. See Green & Levine, supra note 44, at 155 (“[T]here is an overwhelming consensus of
opinion that ethics rules are under-enforced against prosecutors.”) (citing authority).
49. See, e.g., Stern v. U.S. Dist. Court, 214 F.3d 4 (1st Cir. 2000) (U.S. Attorney’s office
brought constitutional challenge to ethics rule restricting prosecutors’ issuance of subpoenas to
lawyers); In re Kline, 113 A.3d 202 (D.C. Cir. 2015) (U.S. Attorney’s office filed amicus brief in
defense of federal prosecutor charged with discovery abuse).
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Senate’s case, when confirming the attorney general and U.S. attorneys.50
Andrew Kent recently identified the potential importance of congressional
oversight into allegations of improper political interference in criminal
prosecutions and pointed to the example of congressional hearings in the 1970s
in response to abuses in the Nixon administration.51 Another notable example
is the 2007 inquiry prompted by the firing of more than a half dozen U.S.
Attorneys under the Bush Administration.52 The conclusion that many were
fired in order to bring partisan considerations to bear on politically-charged
prosecutions led to new legislation meant to provide greater protection for
federal prosecutors’ independence.53
As important as occasional congressional inquiries may be, they are not a
preferable regulatory mechanism for several reasons. First, Congress has
important responsibilities aside from overseeing executive branch agencies, and
it has many agencies in addition to DOJ to oversee, so it must be highly selective
about what inquiries it undertakes. Second, as would also be true of inquiries
by courts or other outsiders, congressional inquiries can interfere with
investigations and prosecutions. DOJ has taken the position that legislative
inquiries “inescapably create the risk that the public and the courts will perceive
undue political and Congressional influence over law enforcement and litigation
decisions” and “also often seek records and other information that our
responsibilities for these matters preclude us from disclosing.”54 This is
something of an overstatement, but inquiries into ongoing cases would be highly
problematic and, in some cases, the President could assert the executive
privilege to block access to information.55 Third, Congress has no authority to
provide a remedy in an individual criminal case or to impose personal or
50. See, e.g., Preserving United States Attorney Independence Act of 2007, 153 CONG. REC.
S3240, S3248 (daily ed. Mar. 19, 2007) (statement of Sen. Patrick Leahy) (“[W]hen it comes to the
U.S. Department of Justice and to the U.S. attorneys in our home States, Senators have a say and a
stake in ensuring fairness and independence to prevent the Federal law enforcement function from
untoward political influence. That is why the law and the practice has always been these
appointments require Senate confirmation.”).
51. See Andrew Kent, Congress and the Independence of Federal Law Enforcement, 52
U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1927, 1957–58 (2019).
52. For discussions of the so-called “U.S. Attorneys Scandal” and its implications, see Bruce
A. Green & Fred C. Zacharias, “The U.S. Attorneys Scandal” and the Allocation of Prosecutorial
Power, 69 OHIO ST. L.J. 187, 204–07 (2008); Adrian Vermeule, Conventions of Agency
Independence, 113 COLUM. L. REV. 1163, 1202 (2013).
53. See Preserving United States Attorney Independence Act of 2007, 153 CONG. REC.
H5553, 5553 (daily ed. May 22, 2007) (statement of Rep. John Conyers).
54. Letter from Rod J. Rosenstein, Deputy Att’y Gen., to Hon. Charles Grassley, Chairman,
Sen. Comm. on the Judiciary (June 27, 2018) (quoting Letter from Robert Raben, Assistant Att’y
Gen., to Hon. John Linder, Chairman, Subcomm. on Rules and Org. of the House, House Comm.
on Rules (Jan. 27, 2000)). See 164 CONG. REC. H5827 (June 28, 2018).
55. The information might be more accessible once revealed to the Inspector General, but
this fact might also affect the willingness of DOJ to cooperate with an ongoing IG investigation.
See Andrew McCanse Wright, Executive Privilege and Inspectors General, 97 TEX. L. REV. 1295,
1299–1304 (2019).
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professional sanctions on individual prosecutors whom it finds have abused
their authority.
Perhaps most significantly, Congress’s oversight of the executive branch
can be highly partisan.56 One cannot trust it to objectively identify the
appropriate standards of prosecutorial independence, find the facts, and apply
the standards to the facts. For example, legislators’ partisanship was evident in
2014 when a House subcommittee examined whether improper political
considerations were influencing career DOJ prosecutors who were investigating
the IRS’s targeting of conservative groups. The Republican chair of the
subcommittee asserted that because the prosecutor had contributed close to
$7,000 to the Obama campaign and the Democratic National Committee, she
could not be disinterested in investigating wrongdoing in the Obama
administration. He declared: “[a] lady with a financial stake in a specific
outcome is heading the investigation, a lady who has invested in the President’s
success is heading the investigation and the President could potentially be a
target of that investigation, and we are supposed to believe this investigation is
credible.”57 The Democrats on the committee, who disagreed, had the better
side of the argument, since federal law, experience, and tradition undercut the
premise that career prosecutors with manifest political preferences are
unqualified to conduct politically-sensitive investigations and prosecutions.58
But in any event, the fact that legislators break down on party lines on questions
like this, as on so many others, suggests that they are unlikely to review
prosecutors’ conduct with the requisite objectivity. And even if they could, the
public would likely discount their conclusion if it aligned with the interests of
the legislators’ political party.
C. Internal Administrative Accountability
Like other entities, government agencies have an incentive to police their
officers and employees to ensure that they are doing their jobs appropriately.
To a significant extent, DOJ is entrusted to regulate its own prosecutors and can
generally be trusted to do so effectively. Under DOJ’s hierarchic structure,
supervisors oversee line prosecutors, and high-ranking supervisors oversee
lower-ranking ones. When alerted to possible wrongdoing, including
inappropriate partisanship, DOJ has the necessary tools to investigate and, when
political abuses are found, to remedy improprieties or sanction prosecutors,
including by adverse job action. Assigning responsibility to an arm of DOJ

56. See, e.g., Andrew McCanse Wright, Constitutional Conflict and Congressional
Oversight, 98 MARQ. L. REV. 881, 886–89 (2014) (noting the partisanship of congressional
oversight when government is divided between the political parties).
57. The IRS Targeting Investigation: What is the Administration Doing?: Hearing Before
the H. Comm. on Oversight and Gov’t Reform, 113th Cong. (2014) (statement of Rep. Jordan,
Chairman, H. Comm. on Oversight and Gov’t Reform).
58. See In re Starr v. Mandanici, 152 F.3d 741, 752–55 (8th Cir. 1998) (Loken, J.,
concurring) (explaining that federal conflict-of-interest statutes and regulations do not require
prosecutors to refrain from political engagement).
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largely avoids the practical harms that an outside inquiry may cause, such as the
disclosure of confidential information. Self-governance also avoids separationof-powers and federalism problems. And DOJ has the necessary expertise to
enunciate the relevant standard of conduct and to do so in a definitive way, as
well as to apply that standard to the facts it adduces.
The question then becomes, which arm of DOJ should police federal
prosecutors, with regard to improper partisanship in particular. Aside from the
Inspector General, there are at least two other candidates. But the principal
deficiency of both is a lack of independence from the very lawyers who have
the greatest incentive and opportunity to exploit DOJ’s power for partisan
purposes, namely, the attorney general and other high-ranking presidential
appointees. These are the DOJ lawyers who are most likely to interact with the
President, who are most closely politically allied with the President (since they
owe their positions to him) and, in some instances, to have political aspirations
of their own, and who have the most authority and opportunity to bring partisan
influence to bear on DOJ’s work.
One possibility, when it is alleged that the federal criminal process was
abused to serve political ends, is for the attorney general to assign a federal
prosecutor who was not involved in the suspect proceedings to investigate. That
is what happened in May 2019 when Attorney General Barr assigned U.S.
Attorney John Durham to investigate law enforcement activities relating to the
2016 presidential election and in October 2020 when Barr appointed Durham
as special counsel to continue the investigation.59 Although the order directed
Durham to focus on violations of law, in theory, the attorney general could have
asked him to look into violations of internal DOJ policy concerning prosecutors’
nonpartisanship.
Another possibility is to assign this responsibility to two DOJ offices—its
Office of Professional Responsibility (“OPR”), which investigates federal
prosecutors’ alleged misconduct,60 and its Professional Responsibility Review
Unit (“PRRU”), which reviews OPR’s misconduct findings and decides what
discipline is appropriate.61 These offices have two advantages over prosecutors
who are assigned responsibility on an ad hoc basis. First, these offices are
traditionally run by nonpartisan career prosecutors, while the attorney general’s
ad hoc appointees, as in Durham’s case, may be political appointees and may
be handpicked by the attorney general based on their sympathy toward the
Administration. Second, prosecutors who are given individual assignments, as
59. See OFF. OF THE ATT’Y GEN., ORDER NO. 4878-2020, APPOINTMENT OF SPECIAL
COUNSEL TO INVESTIGATE MATTERS RELATED TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES AND
INVESTIGATIONS ARISING OUT OF THE 2016 PRESIDENTIAL CAMPAIGNS (Oct. 19, 2020),
https://www.justice.gov/file/1370931/download.
60. Office of Professional Responsibility, U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., https://www.justice.gov/opr
(last visited Mar. 7, 2021).
61. See id.; Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Just., Attorney General Creates Professional
Misconduct Review Unit, Appoints Kevin Ohlson Chief (Jan. 18, 2011),
https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/attorney-general-creates-professional-misconduct-review-unitappoints-kevin-ohlson-chief.
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in Durham’s case, to look into whether a DOJ investigation was properly
conducted, do not necessarily have institutional memory—e.g., prior experience
conducting such investigations, a way to benefit from other investigators’ past
experience, or a way to pass on their experience. In contrast, internal DOJ
offices such as OPR and PRRU can draw on, and build, institutional memory.
This is particularly important because the current expectations regarding
prosecutors’ duty to avoid improper partisan or political considerations are not
well elaborated.
Both of these alternatives have deficiencies, however. Both a prosecutor
assigned to investigate or a lawyer in OPR or PRRU is likely to have sympathies
with federal prosecutors being investigated that will make their work less
objective than that of an outsider.62 More troublingly, these lawyers’
determinations may be overruled by higher-ranking DOJ officials, some of
whom are political appointees. For example, after OPR concluded that John
Yoo, the principal drafter of the so-called “torture memos,” breached his “duty
to exercise independent legal judgment and render thorough, objective, and
candid legal advice,”63 the associate attorney general overruled its finding.64
Oversight is often untroubling, but in the case of politically-charged
investigations, the risk is that the attorney general or other high-ranking DOJ
official, not being disinterested, will have a political and personal motivation to
overrule subordinate DOJ lawyers.65 The allegations of political abuse directed
at Attorney General Barr in the Stone and Flynn cases, among others, point up
the problem. If OPR had investigated these allegations, its findings would
ultimately be reviewable by the attorney general or his appointees, who are selfinterested. Even if the attorney general were not personally implicated in an
62. See Chris Opfer et al., Epstein Investigation Revives Justice Department Turf Battle,
BLOOMBERG L. (Feb. 8, 2019), https://news.bloomberglaw.com/daily-labor-report/epsteininvestigation-revives-justice-department-turf-battle (noting the argument that the Inspector General
is better qualified than the OPR to investigate professional misconduct in the Epstein case because
“the inspector general’s office is independent and makes much of its findings public,” and quoting
Rep. Debbie Wasserman Schultz who characterized the OPR’s work as “like the fox guarding the
hen house”).
63. OFF. OF PRO. RESP., U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., INVESTIGATION INTO THE OFFICE OF LEGAL
COUNSEL’S MEMORANDA CONCERNING ISSUES RELATING TO THE CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
AGENCY’S USE OF “ENHANCED INTERROGATION TECHNIQUES” ON SUSPECTED TERRORISTS 11
(July 29, 2009).
64. Memorandum from David Margolis, Assoc. Deputy Att’y Gen., U.S. Dep’t of Just., to
the Att’y Gen. 2 (Jan. 5, 2010), http://judiciary.house.gov/hearings/pdf/DAGMargolisMemo10010
5.pdf. Margolis’s conclusion that the memos’ drafters did not engage in sanctionable wrongdoing
met with criticism. See, e.g., David D. Cole, The Sacrificial Yoo: Accounting for Torture in the OPR
Report, 4 J. NAT’L SEC. L. & POL’Y 455 (2010); Milan Markovic, Advising Clients After Critical
Legal Studies and the Torture Memos, 114 W. VA. L. REV. 109 (2011). But it was not assumed that
Margolis, who was DOJ’s highest ranking career official, was acting for partisan reasons.
65. Cf. Green & Zacharias, supra note 52, at 246–47 (observing that “to reduce concerns
about partisanship, the Attorney General (who is closest to the White House and so most commonly
identified as a partisan player) might adopt a policy to abstain altogether from involvement in
individual corruption cases, delegating his authority to career prosecutors in DOJ”).
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investigation, any exercise of authority might be, or appear to be, politically
motivated because the attorney general himself is a political appointee. This
risk is compounded because internal findings by an appointed prosecutor or
OPR are ordinarily kept confidential, with the result that senior DOJ officials
who improperly derail an internal investigation may not be held publicly
accountable for doing so.66
D. The Bottom Line
Various different government actors could investigate allegations that
federal prosecutors misused their power for political purposes, but all have
significant limitations.
Federal trial courts’ jurisdiction is too limited. They have power to inquire
into only a fraction of potential abuses, namely those that are the subject of an
objection by the defense in a case before the court, and even then, the applicable
law will often tie the court’s hands. A disciplinary body under the auspices of
the court may also investigate, but constitutional limitations would likely limit
its power, the applicable rules would not afford much leeway, and prudential
considerations would also counsel against taking on federal prosecutors.
Congress is another potential regulator, but congressional committees
have resource limitations, have limited power to act on findings of prosecutorial
misconduct, and most importantly, may be incapable of conducting inquiries
free of partisan biases.
In various respects, internal investigations by lawyers within DOJ offer
the most promising approach, avoiding the separation of powers problems (and,
in the case of state courts, the federalism problems) implicated by external
review. But potential DOJ investigators have limitations of their own, chief
among them being the lack of independence from DOJ’s political appointees.
As we discussed above, those political appointees can be held accountable only
by the electorate, and in this context that is, in reality, so unlikely to happen as
to render this form of accountability practically useless. The question then is
whether there is a more appropriate office within DOJ to undertake principal
responsibility for investigating political abuses in DOJ. The obvious candidate,
to which we turn attention in Part II, is DOJ’s Inspector General.

66. For a brief period under the Clinton administration, OPR selectively published its final
reports, but afterwards DOJ returned to its former practice of keeping its reports confidential, except
where Congress makes them public or there is a heightened public interest as in the case of OPR’s
report on the torture memos. See Bruce A. Green, Regulating Federal Prosecutors: Let There Be
Light, 118 YALE L.J. POCKET PART 156, 160 (Mar. 4, 2009) (asserting that “DOJ’s secrecy
undermines public confidence in prosecutorial accountability. Furthermore, when kept secret,
OPR’s work fails to effectively deter future prosecutorial misconduct or to educate federal
prosecutors about where the disciplinary lines are drawn.”). Instead, OPR publishes short
summaries of its investigations that do not identify their subjects by name. OPR Reports
Investigative Summaries, U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., https://www.justice.gov/opr/investigativesummaries. OPR’s website currently summarizes reports since 2013, none of which address
prosecutors’ misuse of power for political ends. Id.
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THE DOJ INSPECTOR GENERAL’S SUPERIORITY IN INVESTIGATING
PROSECUTORS’ PARTISANSHIP
A. Overview of Inspector General Role

The Office of the Inspector General of DOJ was created in 1988 when
Congress amended the 1978 Inspector General Act.67 Like other IGs, the DOJ’s
IG is appointed by the President with the advice and consent of Congress.
Inspectors General are to be chosen not because of political affiliation but
“solely on the basis of integrity and demonstrated ability” to conduct
investigations involving complex issues of fact and law.68 The President can
remove an Inspector General but must notify Congress of the reasons for doing
so at least 30 days beforehand.69 In 1977, the Office of Legal Counsel within
DOJ concluded that the initial legislation was unconstitutional, but the
obligation to report facts is seen as facilitating proper congressional oversight
rather than impeding the executive function.70
The role of the Inspector General is rooted in early American history.
After George Washington called for the review of organizational problems in
the military, the Continental Congress created an Inspector General for the
army.71 In the 1950s, Congress created an Inspector General and Comptroller
for the Department of State.72 But it was not until the Nixon administration that
Congress expanded the role of Inspectors General, initially creating an IG for
the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare, which later became the
Department of Health and Human Services. A year later, in 1977, Congress
created another Inspector General for the Department of Energy. These served
as models for the Inspector General Act of 1978.73
The purpose of the Act was to install nonpartisan officials whose job
would be to detect waste, fraud, and abuse in the federal government. Months
of testimony revealed how widespread the problem was.74 While some agencies
had internal inspectors, these watchdogs usually reported to individuals within
the agency who were often the target of the investigation.75 Similarly, the same

67. See Inspector General Act Amendments of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-504, title I, § 102(c),
102 Stat. 2515, 2516.
68. 5 U.S.C. app. § 3(a).
69. See id. § 3(b).
70. See John M. Harmon, Inspector Gen. Legis., 1 Op. O.L.C. 16 (1977); Vicki Divoll, The
“Full Access Doctrine”: Congress’s Constitutional Entitlement to National Security Information
from the Executive, 34 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 493, 513–18 (2011).
71. See DAVID A. CLARY & JOSEPH W. A. WHITEHORNE, THE INSPECTORS GENERAL OF THE
UNITED STATES ARMY 1777-1903 23–27 (1987).
72. See Mutual Security Act of 1959, Pub. L. No. 86-108, 73 Stat. 246.
73. See BEN WILHELM, CONG. RSCH. SERV., R45450, STATUTORY INSPECTORS GENERAL
IN THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT: A PRIMER 1 (2019).
74. See Kurt W. Muellenberg & Harvey J. Volzer, Inspector General Act of 1978, 53
TEMPLE L.Q. 1049, 1049–51 (1980).
75. See H.R. REP. NO. 95-584, at 5 (1977); S. REP. NO. 95-1071, at 6 (1978).
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agency officials could determine when to initiate or terminate investigations
into themselves or their programs.76 Allegations of fraud or abuse were often
held for years before they were referred to the DOJ.77 Many agencies had no
independent obligation to audit programs and relied only on complaints, which
were rare, especially since regulations often did not require personnel to report
potential wrongdoing.78
To ensure the requisite independence and remove the conflicts inherent in
the previous model,79 the Act gave IGs the authority to hire staff, conduct audits,
access agency information, and report directly to Congress. IGs are placed
within agencies so they develop the necessary expertise to review agency action
without unduly interfering with agency work.80 They report to both Congress
and agency heads in order to both improve agency functioning and facilitate
monitoring. But agency heads are not allowed to interfere with or control the
work of the IG.81 Thus, IGs were not created to substitute for Congressional
oversight but rather to facilitate it.
Some agencies expressed concern that the IGs would have improper
partisan motivations because they were appointed by the President.82 These
concerns were dismissed in part because of the long term of service and the
requirement that the President explain the reasons for removing an IG.
A key aspect of the IG role is its independence from agency heads. This
was considered critical to ensure proper oversight.83 Similarly, IGs have no
term of office, a deliberate attempt to make sure that IGs would survive a change
in the presidential administration and remain independent of politically elected
and appointed officials.84 Congress amended the IG Act three times, adding
more offices in 1988, including the Inspector General for the DOJ.85 In 2008,
Congress amended the act once again, creating a new Council on Inspectors
General on Integrity and Efficiency (“CIGIE”), which coordinates Inspector
General activity and investigates any alleged wrongdoing by an IG.86 The
guidelines for investigations set forth qualifications for IGs as well as standards.
One of the central requirements is that the office is independent and impartial

76. See H.R. REP. NO. 95-584, at 5 (1977).
77. See id. at 6.
78. See Muellenberg & Volzer, supra note 74, at 1051.
79. See S. REP. NO. 95-1071, at 7 (1978).
80. See H.R. REP. NO. 95-584, at 2 (1977).
81. See 5 U.S.C. app. § 3(a).
82. See H.R. REP. NO. 95-584, at 8 (1977).
83. See S. REP. NO. 95-1071, at 6–8 (1978).
84. See Michael R. Bromwich, Running Special Investigations: The Inspector General
Model, 86 GEO. L.J. 2027, 2029 (1998).
85. See Inspector General Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-452, § 102(c), 102 Stat. 2515
(codified as amended at 5 U.S.C. app. § 3 (11)(2) (1994)).
86. See Inspector General Reform Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-409, 122 Stat. 4302.
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and the guidelines specify some safeguards to ensure this remains so.87 For
example, the guidelines require officials to follow steps to safeguard
independence, identify possible threats to independence, and address them.88
B. The DOJ Inspector General
The DOJ Inspector General is in a better position to investigate
politicization of DOJ than any of the institutions surveyed in Part I. The IG is
unencumbered by separation-of-powers considerations that limit other branches
of government, and has the expertise, tools, time, and resources to conduct
thorough investigations and render reports that are detailed and credible. The
IG has developed guidelines for its work to promote consistency and uniformity
in its approach. The IG is also independent from political appointees, which
helps ensure that its work will not be affected by partisan interest.
The DOJ Inspector General role is much like that of other IGs except for
two significant limitations. First, the attorney general was given the authority
to prohibit, limit, or control any investigation requiring access to certain
categories of sensitive information.89 Second, responding to DOJ’s objection,
Congress left the DOJ Office of Professional Responsibility, not the IG,
responsible for any investigation into attorneys’ discretionary decisions.90
Unlike the IG, however, OPR reports directly to the attorney general and deputy
attorney general.91
This limitation on the IG’s jurisdiction was a compromise to appease the
DOJ, which objected to the new position of IG, claiming that the DOJ was
capable of reviewing the conduct of its own personnel.92 Six years after the role

87. See COUNCIL OF THE INSPECTORS GEN. ON INTEGRITY AND EFFICIENCY, QUALITY
STANDARDS FOR INVESTIGATIONS (2011), https://www.ignet.gov/sites/default/files/files/invprg12
11appi.pdf.
88. See COUNCIL OF THE INSPECTORS GEN. ON INTEGRITY AND EFFICIENCY, QUALITY
STANDARDS FOR FEDERAL OFFICES OF INSPECTOR GENERAL 10–14 (2012),
https://www.ignet.gov/sites/default/files/files/Silver%20Book%20Revision%20-%208-20-12r.pdf.
89. See Inspector General Act Amendments of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-504, title I, § 8D(a),
102 Stat. 2515.
90. See H.R. REP. NO. 100-1020, at 25 (1988) (Conf. Rep.); Inspector General Act
Amendments of 1988 § 8D(b)(3) (requiring IG to refer any allegations of attorney misconduct to
OPR). Both the House Report and the Conference Report on the 1988 amendments indicated that it
would be preferable for the IG to have both the investigative and audit functions. See H.R. REP. NO.
100-771, at 9 (1988); H.R. REP. NO. 100-1020, at 24 (1988) (Conf. Rep.). See also Jurisdiction and
Relationship to the Office of the Inspector General, OFF. OF PRO. RESP., U.S. DEP’T OF JUST.,
https://www.justice.gov/opr/jurisdiction-and-relationship-office-inspector-general.
91. See OFF. OF PRO. RESP., U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., ANNUAL REPORT 3 (2019),
https://www.justice.gov/opr/page/file/1259696/download. See also Scott Shane, Waterboarding
Focus of Inquiry by Justice Department, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 23, 2008) (noting that the investigation
into the DOJ’s legal definition of torture was being conducted by OPR, which reports to the attorney
general, not by the IG who enjoys a greater degree of independence).
92. See H.R. REP. NO. 100-771, at 8 (1988).
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was created, there was a proposal to merge the office of the IG with OPR.93
Attorney General Janet Reno opposed the plan. Her position was echoed by
senior career officials who claimed that the attorney general should be able to
control investigations into attorney misconduct so that she could be held
accountable.94 Senate Judiciary Republicans worried that the merger would
undermine the independence of the head of OPR, Michael E. Sheehan, Jr..
Opposition to the merger was likely motivated by the conviction that
department attorneys should review the conduct of their colleagues, but
congressional leaders questioned whether this was a veiled effort to avoid
accountability. Those who pushed to keep OPR separate from the Inspector
General did so in part because of what they perceived as the traditional
independence of OPR. Senator Orrin Hatch, for instance, was concerned that
the Inspector General, as a political appointee, would be subject to greater
partisan influence than the career official from OPR, who reported to the
attorney general.
In the first two years of the IG’s existence, OPR waged turf wars and
consistently tried to restrict the power of the IG. The deputy attorney general
put his thumb on the scale, defining OPR’s authority broadly so as to increase
its power relative to the IG.95 A government report critical of OPR pointed out
that Congress was initially concerned about the overlapping jurisdiction and
intended to create an independent IG accountable to Congress.96 The central
goal of the Inspector General legislation to remove agency heads’ ability to
control and restrict investigations into their own conduct was undermined by
this exception for OPR and attorney conduct.
This struggle between OPR and the IG highlights the question of whether
independence is better achieved by career officials who answer to a political
appointee or by an officer, such as an IG, who is appointed by the President but
independent from the President’s supervision. While the answer could depend
on which individual holds each office, that obviously cannot comprise a
principled response. Recent events make it clear that the AG’s interest is often
aligned with that of the President, and he can impose his will on those who
report to him.97 Therefore, it seems that independence in this context, as with
93. See Bromwich, supra note 84, at 2030. The Inspector General’s Act left it to the
discretion of Agency heads to transfer functions to the Inspector General so Reno would not have
needed additional congressional authority. See Inspector General Act § 9(a)(2).
94. See Jim McGee, Reno Will Not Merge Two Internal Watchdog Units at Justice, WASH.
POST (Apr. 8, 1994), https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/politics/1994/04/08/reno-will-notmerge-two-internal-watchdog-units-at-justice/cf5b0f56-5093-4119-8a01-3c6f6ad21d71/.
95. See U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., GAO-94-24, LETTER TO HOUSE JUDICIARY
COMMITTEE 3–4 (Apr. 27, 1994), https://www.gao.gov/assets/400/390452.pdf.
96. See id. at 3.
97. For a historical review of attorneys general and their partisan allegiances, see generally
Jed Handelsman Shugerman, Professionals, Politicos, and Crony Attorneys General: A Historical
Sketch of the U.S. Attorney General as a Case for Structural Independence, 87 FORDHAM L. REV.
1965 (2019) (arguing that there have been more politically connected attorneys general in the
modern era).
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other Inspectors General, is better served by separating the investigating
function from the politically-appointed attorney general. If the President choses
to fire the IG, as President Trump did multiple times, at least the act would be
public, allowing for some transparency and possible political repercussions.98
DOJ Inspector General investigations can begin in different ways.
Congress or DOJ can refer investigations to the IG, but the IG’s office can also
initiate its own investigation based on reported information or information it
discovers during the course of its work.99 Unlike special counsels whose work
is limited by the AG’s definition of the scope of the investigation, the IG has
freedom to pursue facts and evidence as it sees fit.100 IGs have seen it as part of
their role to filter Congressional referrals by refusing to pursue investigations
that are designed merely to embarrass agency heads for political purposes.101
They are well suited to investigate politicization of DOJ in part because their
mission has always been to sift politically motivated allegations from real facts.
IGs have the authority to obtain any information from within their
agencies without subpoenas102 and can use administrative subpoenas to obtain
documents and other physical evidence outside of their agencies.103 While they
cannot issue subpoenas for testimony of individuals outside DOJ, they can
interview any employee.104 So the IG already has the tools to investigate
politicization within DOJ. In particular, the IG can obtain records and testimony
regarding federal prosecutors’ internal decision-making processes without other
political branches intruding into those processes.
Like special counsel, but unlike prosecutors, the DOJ’s IG must issue a
report at the end of an investigation. This serves to create transparency in his
methods. In a typical criminal case, prosecutors either charge or decline to
charge. Professional ethics and grand jury secrecy usually prevent a prosecutor
from issuing reports or narrative descriptions about the nature of the
investigation.105 This makes sense given the importance of protecting witnesses
and uncharged individuals from danger, retaliation, and reputational harm. Like
special counsel, however, the IG is bound to issue a report. The narrative will

98. For a list of the IGs who have been fired by President Trump, see ANNE JOSEPH
O’CONNELL,
BROOKINGS
INST.,
WATCHDOGS
AT
LARGE
(Aug.
6,
2020),
https://www.brookings.edu/research/watchdogs-at-large/.
99. See Bromwich, supra note 84, at 2032.
100. The attorney general determines the scope of a special counsel’s investigation. 28
C.F.R. § 600.4(a) (2007). If the special counsel determines that the scope of the investigation ought
to be different or broader, he must ask the AG for permission to expand or alter is parameters. Id.
§ 600.4(b).
101. See Bromwich, supra note 84, at 2033.
102. See 5 U.S.C. app. § 6(a)(1)(A).
103. See id. § 6(a)(3).
104. See id. § 6(a)(4).
105. See generally Jessica A. Roth, Prosecutorial Declination Statements, 110 J. CRIM. L.
& CRIMINOLOGY 477 (2020) (discussing the rare situations in which prosecutors make public
statements after declining to bring criminal charges).
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allow the public to assess not only the conclusions but the nature and fairness
of the investigation itself.
Some may worry that IGs themselves could be corrupted, motivated by
their own political leanings. This is unlikely because the IG is not a political
actor, has specific training and expertise, and has no direct ties to partisan
interests. But even if these structural safeguards fail, there are sufficient
oversight and checks on the IG. First, the President can fire IGs without cause
but must notify Congress of the reasons for the decision. Congress also oversees
the Office of Inspectors General. The House and Senate Judiciary committees,
the House Government Reform, and the Senate Governmental committees all
oversee the DOJ IG. The appropriations committee also exercises oversight by
determining the resources available to the IG.106 The IG must deliver a report
at the end of an investigation and can be called to testify at any time. While this
sort of oversight risks political pressure on IGs, it also provides a measure of
transparency and political accountability, a check on their otherwise
independent work.107
Not only is the DOJ IG capable of investigating politicization of DOJ, the
office has done so before. In 2006, the IG joined with OPR to investigate the
firing of nine U.S. Attorneys, concluding that the process was flawed and that
Attorney General Alberto Gonzalez failed to ensure the proper oversight to
prevent the improper firing of U.S. Attorneys.108 Finding substantial evidence
that the prosecutors were fired for partisan political reasons, the report
recommended the appointment of special counsel to investigate whether
criminal charges were warranted. The investigation was limited because key
witnesses refused to testify, and while the IG has broad power to compel
testimony within DOJ, former officials simply refused to cooperate.109 At the
same time, OIG and OPR investigated the hiring practices of DOJ, concluding
that the office used inappropriate political criteria in hiring for certain career
positions in the Department, in violation of federal law and department
policy.110 More recently, the IG also investigated the FBI’s initiation of the
Russia investigation, and a significant portion of the report addressed and
rejected the allegation that the decision was affected by the political bias of the

106. See Bromwich, supra note 84, at 2041.
107. See id. at 2042.
108. See The Investigation into the Removal of Nine U.S. Attorneys in 2006: Hearing Before
the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 110th Cong. (2008) (statement of Glenn A. Fine, Inspector General
of The U.S. Dep’t of Just.).
109. See id.
110. Politicized Hiring at the Department of Justice: Hearing Before the Sen. Comm. on the
Judiciary, 110th Cong. (2008) (statement of Glenn A. Fine, Inspector Gen. of the U.S. Dep’t of
Just.).
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agents involved.111 At least some members of Congress agree that the IG is the
best institution to investigate the politicization of DOJ.112
C. Proposed Amendments to Increase IG Independence
The implication of our analysis is that DOJ’s IG should have the leading
role in investigating allegations that DOJ representatives have abused their
criminal justice authority for political ends. This means that Congress should
expand the IG’s jurisdiction by giving it authority and primary responsibility
within DOJ to investigate allegedly politically-motivated decision-making.
This requires shifting at least part of OPR’s authority to the IG. A proposal
currently making its way through Congress would transfer investigative
authority more significantly by empowering the DOJ Inspector General, instead
of OPR, to investigate attorney misconduct.113 We express no view on whether,
as a general matter, the IG should have the job of investigating prosecutorial
misconduct, but focus on the one type of troublesome prosecutorial conduct
where we conclude the IG has a clear institutional advantage as investigator.
When it comes to partisan abuses of power, the IG has greater institutional
competence because it is more independent than OPR, which answers directly
to the attorney general, who, as recent events show, may well exercise control
over an investigation with political implications.
To be clear, our argument is not that the IG should have exclusive
jurisdiction, but that Congress should assign it the leading role. Obviously,
federal trial judges should still resolve motions that implicate prosecutorial
abuses of a partisan nature, and disciplinary authorities should determine
whether prosecutors violated disciplinary rules by acting for political advantage.
Congress should continue its oversight role, both independently of the IG and
in response to IG reports. And if OPR maintains authority over prosecutorial
misconduct generally, there may be cases where the IG should invite OPR to
team up with it or should defer to OPR to investigate broader allegations that
include possible political partisanship. There may also be occasions when it
would be appropriate for the AG, on an ad hoc basis, to appoint a DOJ lawyer
to conduct an internal investigation that encompasses issues of political
partisanship.
In addition to expanding the IG’s jurisdiction, Congress should consider
structural reform to enable the IG to conduct this work more effectively. Like

111. See OFF. OF PRO. RESP., U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., REVIEW OF FOUR FISA APPLICATIONS
OTHER ASPECTS OF THE FBI’S CROSSFIRE HURRICANE INVESTIGATION iii–iv (2019),
https://www.justice.gov/storage/120919-examination.pdf.
112. See Letter from Members of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, to Michael E. Horowitz,
Inspector Gen., U.S. Dep’t of Just. (May 8, 2020), https://judiciary.house.gov/uploadedfiles/202005-08_letter_to_ig_horowitz_re_political_interference.pdf?utm_campaign=2735-519; Letter from
Rep. Jerrold Nadler et al. to Michael E. Horowitz, Inspector Gen., U.S. Dep’t of Just. (Oct. 19,
2020), https://www.law360.com/articles/1321152/attachments/0.
113. Inspector General Access Act of 2021, S. 426, 117th Cong. (2021) (S.685, 116th Cong.
(2019)).
AND
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the potential investigators surveyed in Part I, the IG has limitations. Our
conclusion is not that the IG is perfect but that some institution should take the
lead in policing DOJ politicization and that the IG is the best alternative.
Therefore, besides adding to the IG’s responsibilities, Congress should address
some of the IG’s limitations.
Some reforms have already been proposed, especially to protect the IG’s
independence.114 We have not undertaken to enumerate and analyze proposed
reforms, but we note that some may come at a cost to political accountability
and might run into separation of powers concerns, especially as the increasingly
conservative Supreme Court seems to embrace a version of the unitary
executive theory, which maintains that the President has the power to control
the entire executive branch.115 For example, a bill has been introduced in
Congress to further protect the IG’s independence by providing a fixed term of
service and limiting removal to situations in which the IG has demonstrated
“permanent incapacity, inefficiency, neglect of duty, malfeasance, or conviction
of a felony or conduct involving moral turpitude.”116 We support the bill’s
objective because, as we have emphasized, whatever institution has primary
responsibility for addressing allegations of DOJ partisanship should ideally be
independent of the President, DOJ’s leadership, and other political actors. This
proposal could face challenges, however, because recent Supreme Court
precedent limits the ability of Congress to restrict the President’s power to
remove certain agency heads.117
D. Checks on the DOJ Inspector General
Assigning the job of policing politicization to the DOJ Inspector General
will no doubt invite concerns from those who, fearing the “deep state,” worry
that unaccountable career officials will seize power from the people by
thwarting an elected representative. The proposals to increase IG independence
will only add to these concerns. Critics may argue that the IG, like other career
114. See, e.g., Andrew C. Brunsden, Inspectors General and the Law of Oversight
Independence, 29 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. (forthcoming 2021) (manuscript at 56–59),
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3822429 (proposing eligibility requirements
for IGs and restricting the ability of the President to fill the position during temporary vacancies).
115. See Steven G. Calabresi & Kevin H. Rhodes, The Structural Constitution: Unitary
Executive, Plural Judiciary, 105 HARV. L. REV. 1153, 1158 (1992).
116. Inspectors General Independence Act of 2020, S. 3664, 116th Cong. § 2(a-b) (as
introduced in S. Comm. on Homeland Sec. & Governmental Affairs, May 7, 2020) (providing for
a seven-year term of office and removal only “for permanent incapacity, inefficiency, neglect of
duty, malfeasance, or conviction of a felony or conduct involving moral turpitude”); Inspectors
General Independence Act of 2020, H.R. 6668, 116th Cong. § 2(a-b) (as introduced in H. Comm.
on Oversight & Reform, May 1, 2020). See Letter from Rep. Jerrold Nadler et al. to Michael E.
Horowitz, Inspector Gen., U.S. Dep’t of Just. (May 8, 2020), https://judiciary.house.gov/uploaded
files/2020-05-08_letter_to_ig_horowitz_re_political_interference.pdf?utm_campaign=2735-519;
Letter from Rep. Jerrold Nadler et al. to Michael E. Horowitz, Inspector Gen., U.S. Dep’t of Just.
(Oct. 19, 2020), https://www.law360.com/articles/1321152/attachments/0.
117. See Brunsden, supra note 114, at 22–28.
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officials, is not politically accountable for his acts.118 Giving too much power
to these officials threatens to hobble the presidency. The IG, however, is not as
unaccountable to the voting public as critics suggest, nor is he in much of a
position to seriously undermine presidential authority.119 After all, the IG’s role
is limited to investigating and reporting; it is up to others to act on what the IG
finds. And, perhaps more importantly, in this particular context, direct political
accountability poses more of a danger than it solves because it inevitably comes
with a risk of the very political bias and susceptibility to political influence that
must be minimized to perform the task. Or, in the case of Congress, it comes
with institutional incompetence and structural limits due to separation of
powers. Critics of the deep state assume that political accountability is the only
effective form of accountability, while in this context, political accountability
is largely useless. Transparency and oversight, on the other hand, can be an
effective tool.120
That said, the concern about unelected investigative officials is not
unfounded. After all, in the recent past, starting in 1963, the FBI secretly
gathered information on Martin Luther King, Jr. and later spied on opponents
of the Vietnam War with the knowledge and blessing of President Johnson and
the hopes of weakening the social movement.121 The potential for abuse by
career investigators is not the paranoid invention of those determined to
dismantle the administration state. If, as this Article concludes, the Inspector
General’s office is the right regulator to uncover politicization within DOJ, then
there must be adequate checks on its exercise of power.122
The current political moment is unusual in that those who are suspicious
of bureaucracy and worry that career civil servants are silently working to
undermine the President and the effectiveness of the executive branch have not
traditionally feared federal law enforcement. Critics of career prosecutors have
tended to fear too much executive power in the hands of the President, not too
little.123 In other words, they have feared that the President will commandeer

118. See generally Calabresi & Rhodes, supra note 115 (arguing for limited Congressional
ability to restructure the executive branch).
119. See Ingber, supra note 3, at 145. In the context of arguments about special counsels,
some suggested that safeguards put in place to govern special counsels actually rendered them more,
not less, accountable to the public. See Donald C. Smaltz, The Independent Counsel: A View from
Inside, 86 GEO. L.J. 2307, 2363 (1998).
120. See Green & Roiphe, supra note 5, at 843–55; Ethan J. Leib, David L. Ponet & Michael
Serota, A Fiduciary Theory of Judging, 101 CALIF. L. REV. 699, 728–29 (2013); Paul B. Miller &
Andrew S. Gold, Fiduciary Governance, 57 WM. & MARY L. REV. 513, 553–56 (2015).
121. See David J. Garrow, The FBI and Martin Luther King, ATLANTIC (July–Aug. 2002),
https://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2002/07/the-fbi-and-martin-luther-king/302537/.
122. See generally DAVID ROHDE, IN DEEP: THE FBI, THE CIA, AND THE TRUTH ABOUT
AMERICA’S “DEEP STATE” (2020) (arguing that while Trump and others have turned the notion of
a “deep state” into a toxic way to deflect criticism, the problem of unchecked permanent government
institutions is real).
123. See Rachel E. Barkow, Separation of Powers and the Criminal Law, 58 STAN. L. REV.
989, 1049 (2006) (alluding to the “almost unbridled discretion” of prosecutors to control criminal
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law enforcement to his advantage, as happened with Johnson’s FBI, not that a
President will be thwarted by an overly independent prosecutorial agency.
The shifting concern about prosecutors shows the need for a more settled
view of prosecutorial power and its limits that is not itself dependent on the
political party of the President. There ought to be significant checks on career
investigators and prosecutors, but the President should not be able to use
investigators and prosecutors for his own ends either. Designating the IG to be
the preferred official to uncover politicization within DOJ strikes the best
balance in promoting an independent investigation that is still accountable to
the public. To reiterate: we are not suggesting that the IG is perfect or that the
IG should replace all others with oversight responsibility, but simply that the
IG’s office is the best institution to take the lead in investigating allegations of
DOJ political abuse.
CONCLUSION
The DOJ IG should be given the primary responsibility to investigate
politicization of the DOJ. The IG’s offices have the requisite investigative tools
and an ability to develop institutional memory. Like other DOJ entities, they
can investigate without making the kinds of intrusions into DOJ’s inner
workings that pose constitutional problems. But the IG’s office is more
objective than other DOJ entities. The IG’s offices are designed to be
independent of the agencies they serve without undermining their proper
function. The legislation structures the offices to ensure that IGs do not have
direct political allegiance. They remain sufficiently insulated from agency
heads and political actors to minimize chances that their own political
inclinations will affect their work, and the proposals discussed above would
further insulate the IG from political control.
There is no real threat that a DOJ IG investigation will interfere with
DOJ’s ability, or that of the President, to do legitimate work. The IG has
primarily an information gathering role, and there is little chance that the IG
who works within DOJ would intentionally interfere with a valid ongoing
criminal investigation or prosecution. Further, if an IG were to overstep, there
are remedies. The IG does not operate without oversight but answers to
Congress, which has the power to compel testimony as well as the right to
review reports. The President can fire the IG without cause and need only report
on his reasons for doing so to Congress, once again helping to ensure
transparency without unduly undermining executive power. In addition, reports
that an IG has abused his power can be raised to the Council of Inspectors
General on Integrity and Efficiency. It is therefore unlikely that rogue IGs will
interfere in the executive branch’s law enforcement function, much less that
they will do so for long.

cases); WILLIAM J. STUNTZ, THE COLLAPSE OF AMERICAN CRIMINAL JUSTICE 87 (2011) (pointing
to the “enormous discretionary power” of prosecutors in the United States).
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Finally, the transparency ensured by the particular nature of IG
investigations will help facilitate accountability rather than undermine it. While
those who support a unitary executive may be concerned that these unelected
officials are not directly accountable to the public, in this context, direct political
accountability creates more problems than it solves. Criminal prosecutions are
by nature opaque to public scrutiny. Without an independent recitation and
assessment of prosecutorial decisions, the public will be unable to assess on its
own whether DOJ has become politicized. Without the ability to uncover
necessary information, the public cannot be expected to know which actors were
improperly motivated by political considerations. The public can hardly be
expected to hold anyone accountable at the ballot box without this information.

